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I. INTRODUCTION
U ncertainty and change have harmed the United States airline in-dustry in recent years. Eastern and Pan Am airlines are no longer
flying and other carriers such as Continental, Northwest, TWA, and
USAir have experienced financial difficulties.' American, Delta, and
United, industry leaders, have all suffered record losses, and most post-
deregulation carriers have shut down completely.2 Over-expansion, bad
management, labor unrest, and a poor economy all contributed to the
industry's difficulties, and were exacerbated by the competitive forces
unleashed by the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act.3 Despite the problems
afflicting the airline industry, the federal government does not appear to
favor wide-spread re-regulation of the industry, particularly with respect
to routes, fares, and capacity.4 In response, American carriers are in-
J.D. Candidate, Case western Reserve University School of Law (1994).
See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, CHANGE,
CHALLENGE, AND COMPETrION 1 (1993) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] (report delivered to the
President and Congress).
2 Id. On the other hand, Southwest Airlines has made a profit each of the last 21 years.
Terry Maxon, Southwest's '93 Profits Sky-high, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 3, 1994, at ID.
' Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-504 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.). Among the many provisions of the Act, the government withdrew from
regulating those U.S. destinations airlines could serve, and the government is no longer required
to approve domestic fares. Id.
4 Senate Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Wendell Ford noted that because airlines are in
trouble, the government should not be obliged to provide all of the solutions. Bruce Ingersoll &
Brett Pauley, With U.S. Carriers Mired in a Cutthroat War, Government Assistance Remains Up
in the Air, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1993, at A16. The Clinton Administration and Congress created
the National Commission to Ensure A Strong and Competitive Airline Industry in an attempt to
search for the answers. See Section 204 of the Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise
Improvement and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
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creasingly looking abroad for solutions.5
Statutory provisions presently limit foreign air carrier access to the
U.S. market. Changing this statutory regime could benefit both consum-
ers and the U.S. airline industry. In the short term, U.S. carriers would
gain increased foreign expertise, capital, and traffic. In the long term,
they could secure rights to domestic routes in foreign countries or at
least acquire enhanced inter-regional rights. These steps are needed for
true globalization of the airline industry; otherwise, the current situation
will persist in which governments talk about liberalization while shield-
ing their national carriers behind protectionist barriers.
The agency charged with economic oversight of the airline industry
in the U.S. is the Department of Transportation (DOT).6 DOT's varied
duties often conflict with one another. For example, DOT must enforce
statutory limitations on the rights of non-U.S. carriers to compete in the
U.S.7 At the same time, however, DOT is expected to increase:
[t]he availability of a variety of adequate, economic, efficient, and low-
price services by air carriers and foreign air carriers without unjust
discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or deceptive
practices, the need to improve relations among, and coordinate trans-
portation by, air carriers, and the need to encourage fair wages and
equitable working conditions for air carriers.'
Further complicating matters is DOT's commitment to achieving global-
ization of the aviation industry by reducing non-statutory restrictions on
' This is evident from the large number of agreements and alliances that U.S. carriers have
made with foreign airlines. For example, Northwest and the Dutch carrier KLM have entered into
a broad based strategic agreement. Continental has similar agreements with both Air Canada and
Scandinavian Airline Systems (SAS). Other agreements include Delta with Swissair and Singapore
Airlines, USAir with All Nippon Airways, Alitalia, and British Airways. The lure of such ar-
rangements for U.S. carriers is that these strategic alliances often mean increased passengers on
their domestic systems, expansion of international service, and most importantly in some cases,
an infusion of equity (cash). See, e.g., Northwest, KLM Continue Expanding Joint Service Opera-
tions, AVIATION DAILY, July 19, 1993, at 88 (discussing Northwest's cooperative service agreement
with KLM, the positive effect it has had on Northwest's U.S. market share, and Northwest's
increase in transatlantic operations to nearly ninety percent of capacity).
6 Prior to 1985, economic regulation of the airline industry was overseen by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), however, as part of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the CAB
was dissolved on January 1, 1984. See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1551-1555 (1992).
' See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1372 (1992) (requiring foreign carriers to obtain permits for foreign
air transportation); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1992) (requiring foreign aircraft to be operated by
persons holding certificates or licenses issued by the United States or the nation in which the
aircraft is registered).
8 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(3) (1992).
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foreign air carriers' ability to serve the U.S. market.9 These conflicting
goals have recently forced DOT to make difficult choices in determining
whether to allow foreign carriers to help weaker U.S. carriers with equi-
ty infusions (cash) and enter into strategic alliances (marketing arrange-
ments). Accordingly, U.S. policy has appeared reactionary, controlled
less by principle than politics.' The lack of a comprehensive policy
that is wholly consistent with U.S. law will only serve to undermine
U.S. officials as future aviation treaties are negotiated." As the world's
largest aviation market, the U.S. must develop a policy, consistent with
U.S. law, that will enhance the prospects for a liberal international avia-
tion regime.
This note examines the prospects of international aviation liberaliza-
tion by reviewing the impact of U.S. restrictions on access to its market
and how these restrictions inhibit free trade in aviation services (global-
ization). It examines both the historical and contemporary consequences
of two of the largest restrictions 2 on non-U.S. airlines seeking access
to the U.S. market. They are the prohibition against cabotage by foreign
carriers 3 and the statutory limits on foreign investment in U.S. carri-
ers.'4 The note then evaluates recent DOT decisions which discuss the
above restrictions and analyzes how DOT handles its often inconsistent
In the Matter of Defining "Open Skies," DOT Order 92-8-13 (Aug. 5, 1992).
10 Recent U.S. aviation policy has been described as "Pollyanna" in its belief that if the
U.S. changes its laws, "other countries, out of the goodness of their hearts will" change theirs.
Airlines Want Tougher Bilateral Negotiations Under Clinton, AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 15, 1993, at
80.
1, Acting Assistant Secretary of Transportation Patrick V. Murphy has stated that it is, at
times, unclear who we are negotiating for. Adam Bryant, U.S. Tries to Restore the Once-Friendly
Skies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at Cl.
22 While there are numerous restrictions on foreign carriers operating within the U.S. (free-
dom to price, frequency of service, choice of markets, etc.), many of them can be circumvented
through bilateral agreements. Restrictions on cabotage and foreign ownership are statutory,
however, and cannot be avoided through negotiations.
1" "The origin of the term is in dispute, but cabotage is generally understood as the carriage
of passengers, cargo, and mail between two points within the territory of the same nation for
compensation or hire. Such traffic has traditionally been reserved for the state's own carriers."
Douglas R. Lewis, Note, Air Cabotage: Historical and Modern-Day Perspectives, 45 J. AiR L. &
COM. 1059 (1980). Cabotage has also been defined as "[a] nautical term from the Spanish,
denoting strictly navigation from cape to cape along the coast without going out into the open
sea. In International Law, cabotage is identified with coasting-trade so that it means navigating
and trading along the coast between the ports thereof." BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 202 (6th ed.
1990). Bruce Stockfish notes that cabotage is "'air transport between any two points in the same
political unit, that is to say, in the territory of a State as that term is used in air law."' Bruce
Stockfish, Opening Closed Skies: The Prospects for Further Liberalization of Trade In Inter-
national Air Transport Services, 57 J. AIR L. & COMM. 599, 612 n.47 (1992).
" 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378(a)(4) (1992).
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mandates. The analysis will also explore recent efforts by non-U.S.
carriers to gain increased access to the U.S. market, and examine the
effects of recent U.S. policies on liberalizing the international aviation
regime. Finally, the note offers some proposals on how to achieve a lib-
eral aviation regime.
II. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION AND BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Chicago Convention
Developments in aviation technology during World War II estab-
lished that aviation would play an important role after the war. 5 The
first opportunity to develop an international aviation regime for the post-
war world 6 was at the 1944 Chicago Convention.' Delegates to the
Convention had two major objectives:
1. To draw up a new set of uniform safety and technical standards on
an international scale to replace the outmoded ones which had been
promulgated years before at the Paris and Habana [sic] Conventions.
2. To determine if and to what extent international air transport could
be regulated by international economic control. 8
Several different proposals designed to satisfy the second objective were
discussed.' 9 The permissive U.S. plan envisioned no "regulatory con-
trols of an economic nature."2 Fearing U.S. aviation power and wish-
ing to develop their own airlines, other nations rejected the U.S. propos-
'" A.J. THOMAS, JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION OF SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORT 178 (1951)
(explaining that the technological development achieved during World War II ensured that
aviation would play a pivotal role in post-war development).
6 Prior to this, international aviation had been governed by the Paris Convention of 1919.
Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173. It
was the first treaty to codify the notion of cabotage as it related to air transport. Lewis, supra
note 13, at 1060.
17 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
8 THOMAS, supra note 15, at 191.
19 Among the plans discussed, the U.S. plan was by far the most permissive with respect to
the freedom of airlines to carry traffic in international markets. Other countries sought much
more restrictive regimes. The British wanted to create an "International Air Authority to ...
avoid wasteful competition" by regulating all international air routes. Stockfish, supra note 13, at
603-04. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand wanted an even more restrictive regime, through the
cartelization of international airlines under a single authority. Id.; Barry E. Hawk, Airline Deregu-
lation After Ten Years: The Need for Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement and Intergovernmental
Agreements, 34 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 267, 290 (1989); see also, THOMAS, supra note 15, at
192-94.
' THOMAS, supra note 15, at 192 (noting the surprisingly liberal U.S. position at the Con-
vention considering the highly restricted U.S. domestic market).
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als.2 Alternative ideas for the establishment of an international author-
ity to oversee international aviation were also rejected.'
The Chicago Convention reaffirmed a basic principal of internation-
al law, "that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the air space above its territory."'  This affirmation proved false be-
cause the preamble to the Convention stated that air service should be
developed "on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly
and economically."24 Affirmation of each nation's sovereignty over its
own airspace, therefore, caused a conflict with the Convention's underly-
ing goals and objectives.'s Participation in international aviation was
not premised on an airline's ability to acquire aircraft and advertise ser-
vice; rather, it was based on the degree to which an airline's national
government could secure foreign market access.26 Viewing the Chicago
Convention as a starting point for the development of a liberal interna-
tional aviation regime is dissatisfying, because progress toward an open,
global aviation regime has generally progressed slowly. The creation
of a new world order in aviation would have required states to concede
at least some of their sovereignty. However, the restrictive regime that
was implemented made the Chicago Convention a missed opportunity."
The recognition of individual state sovereignty was the genesis of the
present international aviation regime, and the first failure to liberalize air
transport.
29
The Convention did not adopt an extreme absolute sovereignty
S, See Stockfish, supra note 13, at 603-04.
2 Id.
' Chicago Convention, supra note 17, at art. 1. Article 1 states that "It]he contracting States
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its ter-
ritory." Id
' Chicago Convention, supra note 17, at pmbl. According to the Chicago Convention, "the
future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to preserve friendship and
understanding among the nations . . . yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security."
Id.
2s Stockfish notes that the first article of the Convention "effectively amounts to a con-
tradiction of the right of states to participate equally in the provision of air transport services."
Stockfish, supra note 13, at 603.
2 Id. at 602-03.
27 Id.
' "The Chicago Conference provided a multilateral opportunity for states to respond accord-
ingly through a broad exchange of airline operating rights, but it was not to be." Stockfish,
supra note 13, at 603.
z' The affirmation of state sovereignty over airspace went beyond the borders of an indi-
vidual state. International air routes could not be easily developed if there were no limitations on
a state's ability to extract economic gain through the exercise of sovereignty. See THoMAs, supra
note 15, at 174.
147
148 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L [Vol. 26:143
position. If this was the case, an airline flying between Bombay and
London would be required to seek overflight rights from every country
the aircraft would fly over-or otherwise, fly only over international
waterways.30 At the conference, the U.S. sought to minimize state con-
trol over international aviation by seeking to establish "five freedoms of
the air:"
1. The right to fly over the territory of another country without land-
ing.
2. The right to land in another country for technical reasons.
3. The right to discharge traffic from the home country in a foreign
country.
4. The right to pick up traffic in a foreign country bound for the home
country.
5. The right to pick up traffic in a foreign country and convey them to
yet another country, provided that the flight originates or terminates in
the home country.3
Had the U.S. delegation not pressed for unlimited rights for airlines to
exercise all five freedoms, the Convention might have succeeded in
achieving a multilateral regime without restrictions on airlines flying
between two countries.32
The delegates to the Chicago Convention did agree on universal
application of the first two freedoms.33 Article Six of the Convention,
' See Chicago Convention, supra note 16, at art. 2.
31 Stockfish, supra note 13, at 603-04 n.12.
32 Id. (noting that the five freedoms were rejected out of fear that the U.S. would dominate
international aviation); see also, THOMAS, supra note 15, at 185 (arguing that the U.S. position
was justified by the fact that without the ability to pick-up traffic on long distance flights, after
discharging passengers along the way, aircraft would arrive at a final destination nearly empty).
" International Air Services Transit Agreement, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. No. 487 (Dec. 7,
1944) (this was an ancillary agreement to the Chicago Convention). The failure of the Chicago
Convention to develop economic policies for international aviation was ameliorated by the for-
mation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Convention's general
agreement on other technical regulations which made it "one of the most successful international
agreements ever negotiated." Stockfish, supra note 13, at 606; Despite the failure of the Conven-
tion to create a liberal international aviation regime, the Convention did lead to the creation of
standardized rules concerning the international operation of non-scheduled air service, the nation-
ality of aircraft, and the facilitation of air navigation. Chicago Convention, supra note 17. The
Convention also created the International Civil Aviation Organization whose aims are to:
(a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation through-
out the world;
(b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes;
(c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air navigation for
international civil aviation;
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient
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which requires permission from individual nations to begin scheduled air
service in that country, has been viewed as the beginning of the modem
day bilateral agreement.' Although the governing convention outlining
the process is multilateral, it requires that signatories negotiate specific
commitments and undertakings with each other on a bilateral basis." In
short, the Chicago Convention granted rights to overfly and make emer-
gency landings, but did not grant a right to establish regularly scheduled
commercial landings in another country-an issue that still requires
negotiation between individual nations.36
B. Foreign Ownership
In 1946, the United States and Great Britain signed a bilateral
agreement known as Bermuda L" The agreement represented a sharp
departure from the policies of both nations at the Chicago Conven-
tion. 8 It became the model upon which other bilateral agreements
would be based. 9 Bermuda I established many new routes and privileg-
and economical air transport;
(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that
every contracting state has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines;
(g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
(h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
(i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil
aeronautics.
Id. at arts. 43-44.
3' Article 6 states that "[n]o scheduled international air service may be operated over or into
the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of
that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization." Chicago
Convention, supra note 17, at art. 6.
35 Id.
' These negotiations generally address third and forth freedom rights and other ancillary
issues.
' Air Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-Gr. Brit.-N. Ir., 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter
Bermuda I] (the agreement codified the levels of air service that were to be provided by carriers
of each nation).
3' THOMAS, supra note 15, at 218. The Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the conference
suggested that the ability to reach an agreement with the British was based primarily on political
sentiment in both countries that there should be cooperation in the post war period, which led to
a softening of both nations positions. George P. Baker, The Bermuda Plan as the Basis for a
Multilateral Agreement, lecture delivered at McGill University (April 14, 1947), reprinted in
ANDRFAS F. LOWENFIELD, AVIATION LAw §1.13, at 2-9-11 (2nd ed. 1981).
3 See Stockfish, supra note 13, at 609-10 (explaining that the Bermuda I agreement caused
states to think about traffic rights as a good which could only be sold for the best available
price); see also Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez, Deregulating International Markets: The Examples of
Aviation and Ocean Shipping, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 110 (1984). The basic framework that
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es for both nations' air carriers.40
Not surprisingly, Bermuda I prohibited the granting of traffic rights
to U.S. or British airlines that were not controlled by U.S. or British
nationals. 4' The fact that this clause was in Bermuda I, despite its ap-
parent inconsistency with the U.S. position at the Chicago Convention,
seems to indicate a negotiating victory for the British. The reality is that
despite pressing for unlimited traffic rights at the Chicago Convention,
the U.S. did try to prevent foreign ownership or control of U.S. carri-
ers.42 While several drafts of the Convention included outright prohibi-
tions on foreign ownership, a number of smaller countries, led by El
Salvador, opposed these restrictions because of the need for outside
capital and expertise in order to start their own civil aviation pro-
grams.43 Ironically, the U.S. position of the 1940s advocating a free
market with ownership restrictions, mirrors recent U.S. aviation policy.
The reasons that support the imposition of ownership restrictions
have been subject to some debate. One view holds that the test for
substantial national ownership arose in order to prevent airlines from
taking on "flags of convenience" in countries with less stringent safety
regulations." While governmental concern for ensuring safety is laud-
Bermuda I developed includes 1) international air service must start and terminate in a carrier's
home country; 2) fifth freedom traffic must be an ancillary goal; 3) cabotage traffic must be
reserved for a nation's flag cariers; and 4) international air service can only be operated by a
carrier which is owned and controlled by nationals of the state granting the rights. H.A.
Wassenbergh, International Air Transport: Regulatory Approaches in the Nineties, 17 AIR AND
SPACE L. 69, 74-75 (1992) [hereinafter Int'l Air Transport].
' The agreement contains provisions relating to routes, capacity, and fares. THOMAS, supra
note 15, at 218-24.
41 See Bermuda I, supra note 37, at art. 6.
41 This was one of the few areas which the U.S. and the U.K. agreed on without debate at
the Chicago Convention. Both parties shared the view that until a state was "satisfied that
,substantial ownership and effective control are vested in the nationals of that state,"' no state
would be obligated to grant rights to airlines of another state. Z. Joseph Gertler, Nationality of
Airlines: A Hidden Force In the International Air Regulation Equation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM.
51, 58 (1982).
' Id. See also Marc L.J. Dierikx, Bermuda Bias: Substantial Ownership and Effective Con-
trol 45 Years On, 16 AIR L. 118, 120 (1991).
Gertler, supra note 42, at 60. A flag of convenience is used
to describe the flags of such countries . . .whose laws allow - and indeed
make it easy - for ships owned by foreign nationals or companies to fly
the flags. This is in contrast to the practice in the maritime countries (and
in many others) where the right to fly the national flag is subject to strin-
gent conditions and involves far reaching obligations.
L.F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience - Does the Present Law
Pose Special Liability Issues?, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 63, 64 n.5 (1991). It has also been de-
scribed as the "[plractice of registering a merchant vessel with a country that has favorable (ie.
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able, it is not an objective that is necessarily related to foreign owner-
ship. Article 11 of the Chicago Convention provides that an aircraft
operating in a foreign nation must comply with all of the applicable air
regulations of the host nation." More persuasive is the view that the
U.S. was concerned with security considerations.' 6 These concerns
stemmed from the German and Italian influence in Latin America before
and during World War HI.'7 After World War II, these fears continued
because of the new threat from the Soviet Union.48
Despite nationalist and mercantilist pressures to ensure that airlines
were controlled by nationals of the flag country, potential for industry
liberalization arose from Britain's initial understanding of Bermuda I. 9
The British believed that if a U.S. national was to control a British
airline that had been granted rights under Bermuda I, the British were
not "'obliged"' to rescind the rights of this carrier since both countries
were parties to the agreement." The British agreement with Brazil in-
cluded this liberal interpretation because Brazil explained that it was
unable to operate a wholly national airline." The U.S. initially support-
ed this permissive interpretation; however, the political realities of the
Cold War forced it to reconsider its view.52
less restrictive) safety requirements, registration fees, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (6th
Ed. 1990).
45
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the laws and regulations of a
contracting State relating to the admission to or departure from its territory
of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and
navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the
aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as to nationality, and
shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or
while within the territory of that State.
Chicago Convention, supra note 17, at art. 11.
' Dierikx, supra note 43, at 119.
41 Id. at 119-20.
4' Id. at 123.
Id. at 122.
The text of a letter between the British Ministry of Civil Aviation and Foreign Office
explains the British position:
The Article is, of course, permissive and not mandatory. What it says is that
if . . . the US designated a company to operate from the US to the UK
under the terms of the Bermuda Agreement, and the company were not sub-
stantially owned and effectively controlled by US or UK citizens, we could
reserve the right to withhold or revoke the exercise of rights by that carrier.
We should not, however, be obliged to do so unless we wished.
Id.
51 Id.
51 Id. at 122-24.
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C. Cabotage Restrictions
1. International
Article 7 of the Chicago Convention specifically addressed the issue
of cabotage. Reinforcing notions of sovereignty codified by Article 1,
Article 7 reaffirms a country's right to prohibit aircrafts from other
states from carrying passengers or cargo within its territory." The lan-
guage explicitly prohibits the granting of cabotage rights to another state
"on an exclusive basis."'54 Debate over whether the restriction is "quali-
fied or absolute"55 has arisen because of Article 7's ambiguity.
The restrictive view focuses on the language "an exclusive basis"
and holds that if cabotage is granted to one state, the same rights and
privileges must be made available to other states. 6 The liberal interpre-
tation focuses on the word "specifically" and holds that exclusive grants
of cabotage are allowed, provided that no agreement between parties
contains any clause which would prohibit the granting of cabotage rights
to third parties.57 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
has made several failed efforts to clarify Article 7.58 The consistently
held U.S. position is that the Convention does not require cabotage
rights to be granted to all countries in cases where they have been
granted to only one. Underlying this position is the view that the grant-
ing of cabotage rights is a "sovereign, unilateral judgement" which is
'3 Article VII of the Convention reads:
Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the air-
craft of other contracting States to take on in its territory passengers, mail
and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another point
within its territory. Each contracting State undertakes not to enter into any
arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive
basis to any other State or an airline of any other State, and not to obtain
any such exclusive privilege from any other State.
Chicago Convention, supra note 17, at art. 7.
5 Id.
Lewis, supra note 13, at 1063.
Id. at 1063-64; Z. Joseph Gertler, Towards a New, Rational and Fair Exchange of
Opportunities for Airlines, in EEC AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND REGULATION AND THEIR IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA 199, 202-03 (Peter P.C. Haanappel et al. eds., 1990) (explaining
that if one state was to grant cabotage rights to another country, any third state would be
entitled to the same rights).
See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 13, at 1065; Gertler, supra note 56, at 202.
The main arguments against the need to clarify the ambiguity of Article 7 are that there
are no problems with the system and that developing nations fear that they could be taken
advantage of by stronger carriers from developed nations. Gertler, supra note 56, at 201-02.
[Vol. 26:143
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not affected by Article 7.59 The U.S. position is consistent with the
Swedish proposal, put forth at the 1967 ICAO conference, which called
for clarification of Article 7.' The Swedish delegation believed that the
Convention's delegates did not intend to prohibit agreements which
would ultimately produce more efficient air service.61
2. U.S. Domestic Cabotage Restrictions
The United States has had laws prohibiting cabotage by foreign
carriers since 1926.62 U.S. cabotage laws between 1926 and 1979, re-
served "cabotage traffic for domestic carriers, thus protecting domestic
airlines, workers and markets from the rigors of foreign competition."'63
Congressional motivation behind protecting the domestic market was
based on fear that carriers would use predatory tactics against each other
and harm service levels.' Congress felt that the airline industry was
'9 PABLO MENDES DE LEON, CABOTAGE IN Am TRANSPORT REGULATION 54-55 (1992).
' Sweden proposed deleting the second sentence of Article 7 which deals with the exclusiv-
ity issue. Id. at 63.
6' Id. at 64.
" See Air Commerce Act, 44 Stat. § 568 (1926) [hereinafter ACA); Civil Aeronautics Act,
52 Stat. § 973 (1938) [hereinafter CAA]; Act of August 8, 1953, 67 Stat. § 489 (1953); Federal
Aviation Act 72 Stat. § 731 [hereinafter FAA]. 49 U.S.C. states, in relevant part:
§ 1372 (a) Necessity
No foreign air carrier shall engage in foreign air transportation unless there
is in force a permit issued by the board authorizing such a carrier so to
engage.
§ 1372 (b) Issuance
The Board is empowered to issue such a permit if it finds (1) that the
applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform such foreign air trans-
portation and to conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules, reg-
ulations, and requirements of the Board hereunder and (2) either the appli-
cant is qualified, and has been designated by its government, to perform
such foreign air transportation under the terms of an agreement with the
United States, or that such transportation will be in the public interest.
§ 1508(a)
The United States of America is hereby declared to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United
States ....
§ 1508(b)
Foreign aircraft . . . may be navigated in the United States . . . . [A]ircraft
permitted to navigate in the United States . . . shall not take on at any
point within the United States, persons, property, or mail carried for com-
pensation or hire and destined for another point within the United
States . ...
See also, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1992).
Lewis, supra note 13, at 1070.
These prohibitions are consistent with the way Congress viewed the airline industry. Con-
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too competitive and that this would adversely affect the "financial status
of. . . air carriers and . . . render unsafe a transportation service appro-
priate to the needs of commerce and required in the public interest, in
the interests of the Postal Service, and national defense. '65 In other
words, the purpose behind the Civil Aeronautics Act "was to promote
air transportation through regulated competition." 66
In 1980, Congress passed the International Air Transportation Act
of 1979 which allows for cabotage in limited circumstances. 7 Section
13 of the Act permits an exception for foreign carriers to fly within the
U.S. in situations where an 'emergency' occurs and U.S. carriers cannot
handle the traffic.6 ' The exemption can only be granted if efforts to
accommodate the traffic on other U.S. carriers have been made.6 ' This
exemption cannot extend longer than thirty days and is only available in
situations where it is necessary to avoid undue hardship on airline traff-
ic.7" While Congress may have thought it was protecting the travelling
public, Section 13's provisions are so inherently restrictive that the ex-
gressional legislation has continually reflected the view that the airline industry is a unique
industry and should be protected by the state from destructive competition. Jonathan B. Wilson,
Note, The Lessons of Airline Deregulation and The Challenge of Foreign Ownership of U.S. Air
Carriers, 24 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 103, 111-12 (1990). Domestic carriers were
regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) as to the routes they could serve, and the
markets they could enter. See CAA, supra note 62.
61 S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 2 (1938).
66 SAMUEL B RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION 29
(1961). See also A Bill to Create a Civil Aeronautics Authority to Provide for the Regulation of
Civil Aeronautics for Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 3760 Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 23-29 (1938) (statement of Senator Gorrell) [hereinafter Gorrell
Statement]. Senator Gorrell noted that the problems facing the industry are ones of management
and government politics which could only be solved by enacting economic legislation that would
provide stability for the airlines. Id. From a national security standpoint, the Senator noted that
air transport contributes to national defense in a way that very few other industries contribute in
time of crisis. Id.
67 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1386 (1992).
6S
The Board may . . . to the extent it finds that such action is required in
the public interest, exempt any foreign air carrier for a period not to exceed
30 days . . . to the extent necessary to authorize the foreign air carrier to
carry passengers, cargo, or mail in interstate or overseas air transportation in
certain markets if the Board . . . finds that because of an emergency created
by unusual circumstances not arising in the normal course of business, traffic
in such markets cannot be accommodated by air carriers [and] all possible
efforts have been made to accommodate such traffic by utilizing the re-
sources of such air carriers . ...
Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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ception provides little benefit and does not represent a modification of
the United States' protectionist attitude towards its domestic market.7"
I. PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
A. U.S. Foreign Ownership Laws
U.S. law requires a certificate of public convenience, analogous to a
license, in order to operate a commercial aircraft.72 To obtain such a
certificate, DOT must find the airline to be in compliance with § 1301
which outlines the requirements of U.S. citizenship.73 The statutory lan-
guage defines a U.S. citizen as
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or one of its
possessions, or (b) a partnership of which each member is such an
individual, or (c) a corporation or association created or organized
under the laws of the Untied States or of any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States, of which the president and two-thirds or
more of the board of directors and other managing officers thereof are
such individuals and in which at least 75 per centum of the voting in-
terest is owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the United
States or of one of its possessions.74
Most conflicts arising through DOT's examination of a carrier's
conformity with U.S. citizenship requirements involve the "control"
component. In essence, the "control" test is an evaluation by DOT of
who is actually controlling the airline. Therefore, satisfaction of the
statutory percentages is often not sufficient; the airline must actually be
controlled by U.S. citizens.75 One of the reasons for these ownership
restrictions is related to national security concerns.76 In addition, eco-
nomic concerns surround the fact that outside of the United States, a
majority of the world's airlines are either government-owned or subsi-
dized.' The prohibition on foreign ownership was designed to prevent
"' Lewis, supra note 13, at 1084 (noting that the provisions are "only a minimal concession
to the public's interest" and give "unduly excessive weight [to] domestic carrier and labor inter-
ests").
7 See FAA, supra note 62.
7 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(d)(1) (establishing requirement for certification), § 1302 (matters to
consider in the public interest) (1992).
7' 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1992).
7 Jeffery D. Brown, Note, Foreign Investments in U.S. Airlines: What Limits Should Be
Placed on Foreign Ownership of U.S. Carriers? 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1269, 1275-76 (1990).
7' Wilson, supra note 64, at 146. Congress originally viewed the airline industry as
analogous to the merchant marine and believed that the air transportation system must be main-
tained and ready for war. See Gorrell Statement, supra note 64, at 31-32.
' For example, of the eight largest European airlines, only British Airways is entirely
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a state-owned foreign carrier from buying a U.S. carrier and competing
unfairly in the domestic U.S. market to the detriment of private U.S.
carriers."
The present international regime including foreign ownership restric-
tions, state control of routes through bilateral processes, and domestic
airlines' freedom from international competition on domestic routes,
dates to at least the mid-1940s. Liberalization of world trade over the
last twenty-five years has affected international aviation and should
make maintenance of the status-quo a tenuous proposition.79 Changes in
international aviation have upset the stability of the old regime and have
forced states to rethink the validity of the reasons that they proffer as
justification for protecting their national airlines. 0
IV. CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF CABOTAGE
A. Statutory Interpretation
Congress' overt action to protect the domestic U.S. airline industry
has made cabotage violations very rare. However, in 1992, Aerovias, a
Guatemalan carrier, was found to have violated 49 U.S.C.S. app. §
1372" by engaging in illegal cargo flights.82 DOT ruled that Aerovias
had operated flights between the U.S. and foreign countries without
proper authorization.83 Additionally, the carrier had conducted eleven
flights between Palau (U.S. Trust Territory) and Saipain (U.S. Trust Ter-
ritory).' DOT noted that "[c]abotage and other unauthorized operations
privately owned. Of the remaining seven airlines, two are almost completely state owned (Air
France and Iberia), and three are at least half owned by governments (Alitalia, Lufthansa, and
SAS). Only KLM and Swissair are less than fifty percent government-owned. Kenneth Labich,
Europe's Sky Wars, FORTUNE, Nov. 2, 1992, at 88, 90.
" This could have a dramatic impact on U.S. aviation policy because it would certainly
color the nature and tone of future U.S. aviation negotiations with a foreign county, as well as
have a drastic effect on domestic carriers' ability to remain profitable.
" British Airways Deputy Chairman Colin Marshall stated that the "root of the airline
industry's problem is the 'obstacle of nationalism' . . . created by state-ownership and nurtured
by the bilateral process." Marshall Warns Against Turning Down BA/USAir Deal AVIATION DAI-
LY, Oct. 15, 1992, at 80.
' See generally James P. Woolsey, Governments Must Surrender Control; Interview With
Colin Marshall Deputy Chairman of British Airways, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Dec. 1991, at 29
(indicating that airlines should make decisions on a commercial basis, not as protected compa-
nies).
8 49 U.S.C. app. § 1372(a) states that "[n]o foreign carrier shall engage in foreign air
transportation unless there is in force a permit issued by the Board authorizing such carrier so to
engage." Id.
' See DOT Consent Order 92-4-21 (Apr. 8, 1992).
3 Id.
8 United States Trust Territories are part of the U.S. for purposes of the F.A.A. See 49
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into the U.S. by foreign air carriers purloin the economic opportunities
available to U.S. carriers. As such, these unlawful operations are serious
matters warranting significant enforcement action."85 Aerovias countered
that it had been misinformed about the fact that it was providing service
to U.S. destinations.
86
DOT is very hesitant to use its authority under the International Air
Transportation Competition Act to grant exceptions for cabotage flights,
except in extremely compelling circumstances. The threshold test for
DOT authorization is:
1) that the authority is required in the public interest;
2) that because of an emergency created by unusual circumstances not
arising in the normal course of business the traffic cannot be accom-
modated by U.S. carriers holding certificates under section 401 of the
Act;
3) that all possible efforts have been made to place the traffic on U,S,
carriers; and
4) that the transportation is necessary to avoid undue hardship to the
passengers (or cargo) involvedY
DOT requires that any carrier requesting a cabotage exemption must
serve notice on all U.S. carriers who may be able to accommodate the
traffic.88 For example, when a U.S. carrier suspended operations, live
camels en route to Los Angeles were stranded in Honolulu.89 Quantas,
an Australian carrier, operated between Honolulu and Los Angeles with
an aircraft configuration capable of transporting the camels. In order to
get the business, Quantas was required to serve notice on all U.S. carri-
ers that had an appropriate cargo configuration and scheduled service to
Hawaii from the U.S. mainland.9' After no U.S. carrier expressed inter-
est in providing an aircraft, DOT granted the exemption because the
situation "clearly constitute[d] an emergency created by unusual circum-
stances not arising in the normal course of business."9
U.S.C. app. § 1301(41) (1992).
85 Id.
9 Id.
" The Application for Emergency Exemption is made pursuant to FAA § 416(b)(7), DOT
Order 86-8-37 (Aug. 15, 1986) (denying Lineas Aereas Del Caribe, S.A., the right to carry 90
cattle between Miami, Florida, and San Juan, Puerto Rico, on behalf of Arrow Air). See also 49
U.S.C. app. § 1386(b)(3) (1992).
' See Application of Quantas Airways Limited for Emergency Exemption made pursuant to
FAA § 416(b)(7), DOT Order 91-10-10 (Oct. 4, 1991).
89 Id.
9 Id.
91 Id.
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While DOT, and its predecessor CAB, grant exemptions in emer-
gencies, it adheres to the statutory language very closely. In two dif-
ferent cases, DOT has denied requests for exemptions when surface
transportation was an option,9' and has allowed passengers to become
stranded when American carriers have needed a weekend to service a
passenger backlog.93 In the latter instance, 240 passengers were in dan-
ger of being stranded over the weekend in San Juan because of Prinair's
unscheduled maintenance problems.94 Air BVI filed an emergency ex-
emption and requested the right to provide transport for the stranded
passengers.95 CAB denied the request and stated that there were a suffi-
cient number of non-certified air carriers (air taxis) on Puerto Rico
which could provide extra flights.96
B. Shifts in Policy Interpretation
While the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 eliminated much of the
economic regulation of the airline industry, Congress has been unwilling
to repeal laws relating to cabotage. Congressional legislation forced the
CAB, and now DOT, to tell foreign carriers that they cannot regularly
compete in domestic U.S. markets.97 As a result, U.S. consumers and
shippers probably pay higher fares than necessary for air service because
the maximum number of potential competitors in any given market is
never realized. Most troubling though, is that U.S. restrictions on com-
petition can seriously jeopardize DOT efforts to obtain better opportuni-
ties for U.S. carriers in other countries because DOT cannot offer cabo-
tage rights as an inducement for more meaningful concessions from
foreign states.
However, views on cabotage are beginning to change. Both DOT
and the U.S. airline industry were opposed to cabotage as recently as
the mid-1980s.98 As recently as 1986, DOT officials said that cabotage
' See Application of Heavylift Cargo Airlines Limited for Emergency Exemption denied
pursuant to FAA § 416(b)(7), DOT Order 85-12-78 (Dec. 27, 1985).
9 See Application of Quantas Airways Limited for Emergency Exemption made pursuant to
FAA § 416(b)(7), DOT Order 85-6-20; Application of Air BVI for Cabotage Exemption, DOT
Order 84-2-108 and Cabotage Exemption Denial, § CAB 388 (Feb. 24, 1984).
9 Id.
9 Id.
96 id.
' See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
9' James K. Gordon, Canadian-U.S. Bilateral Talks Hinge on Cabotage Agreement, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Dec. 2, 1985, at 45; cf. Jane Levere, Cohen Urges Cabotage
Liberalization to Bargain for Overseas Rights, TRAVEL WKLY., Nov. 4, 1985, at 68 (discussing
former CAB chief Marvin Cohen's call for a repeal of cabotage rights).
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was an idea which would one day be accepted, but which could not yet
be realized.9 Industry leaders have also called for change. Former Tex-
as Air and Eastern Airlines chairman Frank Lorenzo stated in 1991, that
"cabotage in the U.S. would strengthen competition. ' '""° Delta Airlines
also supports limited cabotage t"t A year earlier, former DOT Assistant
Deputy Secretary of State for Transportation and Telecommunications
stated that "[t]he time is ripe for discussions ... in the area of cabotage
rights.""1 °e The softening of views on cabotage by some American car-
riers is motivated by U.S. carriers' desire to secure additional rights
overseas in return for a relaxation of cabotage in this country. This is
particularly true with respect to the largest carriers which have little
opportunity for domestic growth given that they already serve nearly
every significant U.S. market. 3
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) is the most significant and
consistent opponent of any liberalization of existing cabotage restric-
tions." ALPA President, Captain J. Randolph Babbitt, believes that if
cabotage is granted, foreign carriers would only compete in the most
attractive routes that are already extensively served by U.S. carriers.
' See Joan Feldman, Will the U.S. Ever Grant Cabotage Rights; International Air Space
Law, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Sept. 1986, at 26; Fran Durbin, Official Urges Look at Canadian
Service on U.S. Intercity Routes, TRAVEL WKLY., Nov. 27, 1986, at 13; Jeffery Shane, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation Discusses Cabotage Rights, TRAVEL WKLY., Nov.
27, 1986, at 13, (discussing how U.S. law and policy are opposed to "cabotage in any form"
and, therefore, should not be a subject of U.S.-Canadian bilateral negotiations).
"o Lorenzo Calls on Government to Review Bilateral Objectives, AvIAbON DAILY, Dec. 19,
1991, at 495.
'01 Delta Supports Limited Cabotage, Increased Foreign Ownership, AVIATION DAILY, Nov.
25, 1991, at 345. Under Delta's proposal, a foreign air carrier could fly from a foreign country
to a U.S. destination A and collect additional domestic passengers for the on-going flight to U.S.
destination B (this is known as limited or tag-end cabotage). Delta does not support full-scale
cabotage rights (full scale cabotage would not require the flight to originate in a foreign country)
in the United States, unless U.S. carriers would be granted the same routes within Europe as a
whole. Id. Carriers Push Increasing Foreign Ownership As Mainstay of Opening Skies, AVIATION
DAILY, June 5, 1992, at 409. Other smaller U.S. and foreign carriers, while not opposed to
cabotage, do not believe it will have any impact on the existing market power of larger U.S.
carriers. Id.
0 Matthew V. Scocozza, EEC-US Aviation Relations and Cabotage, in EEC AIR TRANSPORT
POLICY AND REGULATION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA, 211, 216 (Peter P.C.
Haanappel et al. eds., 1990); compare with Gordon, supra note 98, at 45 (at a meeting between
U.S. and Canadian, negotiators the U.S. informed Canada that cabotage rights would be impossi-
ble to grant because of wide-spread industry opposition).
203 James S. Hirsch, Code Sharing Leaves Fliers Up in the Air, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1993,
at BI.
"04 President Clinton has also expressed opposition to loosening cabotage restrictions, although
he has not explained why. Clinton Opposes Cabotage, Changing Foreign Ownership Rules,
AVIATION DAILY, Sep. 23, 1992, at 511.
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This would cut directly into U.S. carrier revenue while offering a limit-
ed benefit to U.S. consumers.' Babbitt has envisioned an exchange of
cabotage rights with Singapore."te Singapore Airlines would fly be-
tween Minneapolis and Seattle; in return, Northwest would be able to
fly anywhere in Singapore. 7 But according to the ALPA, there can be
"no quid pro quo concerning the domestic routes of the United
States.""'
ALPA claims that cabotage would devastate an industry that has
realized only a two percent return on equity investment over the last
decade."° Its opposition to cabotage rights even extends to Canadian
carriers,"'0 fearing that the Chicago Convention would entitle other na-
tions to similar rights."' According to ALPA, the experience of other
industries such as "shipping, textiles, and electronics," is evidence of the
results of too much free market competition and why the airline industry
needs continued protection."' While ALPA clearly has an interest in
maintaining union jobs and wage rates, its assertion that there is more to
a successful U.S. aviation policy than lowering fares has merit. Policy
choices must also consider the interests of investors and airlines and the
commercial health of the nation."'
The ultimate goal of foreign carriers is to increase access to the
world's single largest air transport market, thereby competing more
effectively for international traffic to and from the United States." 4
This competitive desire has refocussed the cabotage debate. The prohibi-
' Hearings Before Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. of Public Works and Trans-
portation, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Captain J. Randolph Babbitt) [hereinafter
Aviation Policy Statement].
"0 Captain J. Randolph Babbitt, Speech at Solomon Brothers, Inc. Sixth Annual Transporta-
tion Conference (Nov. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Babbitt on Cabotage].
07 Mr. Babbitt's remarks seem exaggerated - it is unlikely the U.S. would grant cabotage
rights to a country with virtually no domestic market. Additionally, the route between Minne-
apolis and Seattle could probably withstand additional competition, as Northwest is the only
carrier offering non-stop service on the route, and alternative routings are circuitous and involve
hubs in Salt Lake City, Denver, or points South and East of Minneapolis.
"o See Babbitt on Cabotage, supra note 106.
109 Id.
"11 The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry and The Adequacy of Competition: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,
102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Captain J. Randolph Babbitt).
. ALPA's view is not consistent with U.S. policy and such a scenario is not likely to
occur. See supra text accompanying notes 53-61.
112 Id.
"3 NAWAL K. TANEJA, U.S. INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY 73 (1980).
"4 The U.S. market accounts for approximately forty percent of total world air travel. Avia-
tion Policy Statement, supra note 105.
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tion of cabotage expressly prevents foreign carriers from carrying do-
mestic traffic." 5 The U.S. may not change its laws with respect to
purely domestic cabotage; however, "limited" or "tag-end" cabotage
could become a reality. 16 "Limited" or "tag-end" cabotage describes a
situation where a foreign carrier flies between two points in a country as
a continuation of an international flight."' Although the evidence is
imperfect, it can be argued that foreign carriers have essentially legally
duplicated this type of cabotage by entering into code-sharing"' or
blocked space agreements" 9 with U.S. carriers. Dependent upon receiv-
ing reciprocal rights from foreign governments, the U.S. has generally
approved this practice. 2 In order to receive this right, a foreign carri-
er and its domestic U.S. counterpart must apply for a statement of au-
thorization under 14 C.F.R. 207.10, which prohibits carriers from per-
forming flights for one another without DOT authorization.' DOT
"' 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1992).
... See, Canadian Study Urges Limited Cabotage for its Carriers Without Reciprocity, AVIA-
TION DAiLY, Feb. 13, 1992, at 267.
17 DE LEON, supra note 59, at 103. This type of cabotage has recently begun within the Eu-
ropean Community-although there are limitations on the number of seats that a carrier may sell.
See, Air France to Use Cabotage Rights, TRAVEL WKLY., Dec. 24, 1992.
' Code-sharing is based on a contract between air carriers, enabling one of them . . . to
extend
its scheduled international air services as published under its own code and
line-numbers and operated by itself, to a point or points not served by it
and situated beyond a point (most often the terminal point) which it serves
with its own service(s) by including in the publication of its network, a
connecting service of another carrier(s) . . . as a service of its own to such
beyond points.
Int'l Air Transport, supra note 39, at 73. A less technical definition of code-sharing "refers to
the computer reservations system (CRS) code, [which] allows the airlines to display each other's
flights in computer reservations systems." James Ott, Market Pressures to Spur U.S., Canadian
Alliances, AvATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, May 25, 1992, at 24.
119 A blocked space agreement is when carrier A is given a specific amount of guaranteed
capacity on a particular flight by carrier B. This ensures that there is always capacity available
for carrier A. Int'l Air Transport, supra note 39, at 74. "Blocked space agreements am leases of
a determined portion of an aircraft, such as the seats and/or cargo space. An agreed sum is paid
by the lessee to the lessor regardless of the utilization made by the lessee of the leased space."
Burton A. Landy, Cooperative Agreements Involving Foreign Airlines: A Review of the Policy of
the United States Civil Aeronautics Board, 35 J. Ant L. & COMM. 575, 576 (1969).
'" Nearly all of the major U.S. carriers have reached code-share agreements with foreign
carriers. Some of the larger agreements included Continenta-SAS, Northwest-KLM, USAir-British
Airways. See Application of United Airlines, DOT Order 88-3-38, (Mar. 21, 1988) [hereinafter
DOT Order 88-3-38] (stating that all code-share arrangements will require a statement of authori-
zation under either 14 C.F.R. 207 or 212).
12 "A direct air carrier shall not perform any flights for a direct foreign air carrier under a
long-term wet lease unless it has obtained a statement of authorization under this section." 14
C.F.R. § 207.10(a) (1992). "A wet-lease normally involves the lease of an aircraft with the fuel
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must approve these types of agreements by verifying that the arrange-
ment is consistent with public interest and that the non-U.S. carrier has
the necessary underlying economic authority to serve a particular desti-
nation.12 Determination of whether code-sharing is in the public inter-
est requires evaluation of many factors. These include:
[t]he extent to which the authority involved is covered by and consis-
tent with a bilateral aviation agreement, and, in the absence of an
agreement covering the proposed services, whether reciprocity exists on
the part of the homeland of the foreign carrier or carriers involved.
Where circumstances warrant, we will also look at other factors, such
as the benefits which would accrue to U.S. carriers, passengers, and
shippers under the proposed arrangement."2
When a code-sharing exemption is granted, DOT requires that the ticket
and other media for transmitting information about the flights reflects
the name of the carrier actually providing the transportation, and that
carrier accept responsibility for the passengers, consistent with its con-
tractual obligations." In addition, DOT requires the airlines involved
"to give reasonable and timely notice of the existence of such code-
sharing arrangements. ' ' "as
For example, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) and Continental
Airlines have a code-sharing agreement. 26 In renewing the agreement
in 1990, DOT found that the arrangement "increase[d] the service op-
tions available to the public and result[ed] in substantial economic bene-
and crew to carry out the specific operation. A significant factor in this arrangement is whether
the lessor or the lessee exercises operational control of the aircraft." Landy, supra note 119, at
576.
'n DOT Order 88-3-38, supra note 120. Under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b):
[t]he Board (DOT) shall issue permits, orders, or regulations to such extent
only as it shall find such action to be in the interest of the public: Provid-
ed, however, That in exercising its powers hereunder, the Board shall do so
consistently with any treaty, convention, or agreement which may be in
force between the United States and any foreign country or countries ....
49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1992).
2 Application of Transavia Holland, B.V., DOT Order 88-3-51 (Mar. 24, 1988).
32 Application of Gulf Air, DOT Order 88-6-3 n.10 (March 1988) (forcing carriers to accept
responsibility so that passengers know with which carrier they have recourse against in the event
of an irregularity).
14 C.F.R. § 399.88 (1992) (requiring notice of code sharing in any published schedules,
advertisements, and at the point of ticket purchase).
" Applications of Continental Airlines and Scandinavian Airlines, DOT Order 88-12-46 (Dec.
23, 1988); In the Matter of the Acquisition of Stock in Continental Airlines Holdings by Scandi-
navian Airlines, DOT Order 90-9-15 (Sept. 12, 1990); Application of Continental Airlines and
Scandinavian Airlines, DOT Order 92-1-35 (Jan. 22, 1992).
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fits [being] accru[ed] [by] Continental."127 In practice, this agreement
allows passengers to travel between any point in SAS's system and spe-
cific points in the United States.' For example, a passenger who
wishes to fly from Stockholm to Los Angeles could fly on SAS non-
stop to Los Angeles, or fly SAS nonstop to Newark and transfer to a
Continental Airlines flight, which also has a SAS code for the domestic
U.S. segment.' Continental is authorized to sell tickets from any of
its U.S. points of origin to Scandinavia and beyond, while advertising
these flights as if the passenger were flying Continental for the entire
journey. 30 Code-sharing also enhances the airlines' ability to attract
passengers because code-shared connections are given priority ranking
over interline connections.' in computer reservation systems. Travel
agents, often working under severe time restraints, are more likely to
select the first flight appearing on their computer screens for their cus-
tomers. Thus, improving a flight's computer ranking should generate ad-
ditional passengers.'
While these agreements do produce more competition, they raise
several legal questions.'33 As a result of its DOT approved marketing
agreement with Continental, SAS is gaining access to a larger portion of
the U.S. aviation market. This increased access appears contrary to the
spirit of U.S. cabotage laws.
Air transport is subject to much more international competitive
pressure than sea travel which has no access to internal markets."M
Therefore, by allowing a foreign carrier to fly to a destination specified
in a bilateral agreement and code-share with a domestic carrier for traf-
fic from other internal markets, one can affect the competitive position
of other U.S. carriers. 35 For example, assume that only three carriers
serve Stockholm non-stop from the U.S.: Delta through Atlanta, Ameri-
can through Chicago, and SAS from Newark. A Stockholm-bound trav-
eller, travelling from St. Louis, prior to the code-sharing arrangement,
" See DOT Order 88-12-46, supra note 126.
128 Id.
129 Id.
'" For a discussion of the limitations, see 14 C.F.R. § 399.88, supra note 125.
1 Competition in the Airline Industry, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, (Sept. 21, 1989) (statement of Kenneth M.
Mead) (transcript available in the United States General Accounting Office).
"3 See generally 14 C.F.R. § 255 (1992) (regulating carrier-owned reservation systems).
13 See DE LEON, supra note 59, at 116 (questioning whether code sharing violates either
national cabotage laws or Article 7 of the Chicago Convention).
'3 Lewis, supra note 13, at 1063.
'3 DE LEON, supra note 59, at 116 (noting that code-sharing agreements increase the value
of bilateral agreements without any quid pro quo).
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would likely fly through Atlanta or Chicago in order to remain on the
same U.S. carrier. Travelling on SAS would have meant flying to New-
ark, changing terminals, and perhaps re-checking tickets and luggage.
However, after the implementation of the code-sharing agreement, this
same passenger could fly Continental to Newark and transfer within the
same terminal to an SAS flight, as if the passenger were transferring to
another Continental flight. Under a code-sharing arrangement, there is no
advantage to flying on an American carrier for the entire journey.
While the above model is somewhat simplified, it highlights how a
code-sharing arrangement can dramatically increase a foreign carrier's
ability to gather passengers beyond traditional gateway cities. Since
cabotage restrictions were designed to provide a domestic monopoly for
national carriers, code-sharing undermines the purpose of cabotage prohi-
bitions-particularly on routes non-U.S. carriers would not otherwise
operate.'36 Through code-sharing, SAS has tapped into Continental's
established hub-and-spoke network, gained a better position in airline
computer reservation systems, and benefitted from Continental's market-
ing efforts-including its frequent flier program. Thus, SAS and Con-
tinental have achieved the air carrier goal of "seamless" service, which
allows a passenger to check-in at her local airport and claim her bag-
gage at her final destination, as if she was on a single airline for the
entire trip.'37
C. Code-Sharing and U.S. Cabotage Law
Code-sharing ultimately provides additional opportunities for foreign
carriers to gain traffic they would not have otherwise captured, resulting
in additional U.S. passengers on foreign carriers.'38 This raises the
legal question of whether code-sharing violates the prohibition on cabo-
tage. DOT's position is that since the foreign carrier is only exercising a
contractual right to sell air service to cities in which it already has
traffic rights, it is not cabotage.'39 Additionally "[c]ode-sharing is a
"6 Id. at 116-17.
137 Hirsch, supra note 103.
138 See infra text accompanying note 145.
139 H.A. Wassenbergh, New Aspects of National Aviation Policies and the Future of Interna-
tional Air Transport Regulations, 13 AIR L. 18, 26 (1988). While many believe that code-share
agreements are not cabotage, airline executives might disagree. In 1987, British Airways' Market-
ing Director, Jim Harris, noted that the proposed joint marketing plan between United Airlines
and British Airways, which included code-sharing, would allow British Airways "'vastly increased
penetration of the vital U.S. market."' Nadine Godwin, United, British Airways Team Up With
Global Joint Marketing Plan; Would Become Essentially One Airline, TRAVEL WKLY., Dec. 17,
1987, at I. See also United's Union Buyout Would Limit Management Action, AVIATION DAILY,
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private law arrangement. It is not the 're-flagging' of the aircraft of the
carrier operating the connecting service. A code is not a flag."'"
Code-sharing does not violate the letter of U.S. law because the
airplane actually carrying passengers within the United States is owned
and operated by U.S. nationals. 4' It does, however, raise questions as
to whether the spirit and intent of U.S. law is violated. In 1987, KLM
attempted to receive operating authority between Amsterdam and Orlan-
do. As part of its proposal, KLM envisioned using small U.S. carriers,
Air Atlanta and Florida Express, as well as KLM's code to provide ad-
ditional connecting service to smaller U.S. cities.' Opposition to the
proposed plan was fierce. The Air Transport Association called the idea
"a 'disturbing proposal that is similar in concept to cabotage.""43
ALPA claimed that the proposal would result in cabotage and stated that
they did not want the "'prohibition against cabotage eroded, compro-
mised or undermined in any way.""'  Congress was also concerned
about the proposed agreement. In both the House and Senate reports on
DOT appropriations, Congress warned the DOT that "code-sharing
agreements should not be permitted if the results would be to undermine
well established restrictions on cabotage or to give foreign carriers an
unfair trade advantage and transfer American jobs to our competitors
abroad."'4 The Senate report further noted that if foreign carriers were
granted expanded code-sharing rights without reciprocal gains for U.S.
carriers in other nations, then such agreements should be prohibited.'"
While the Senate report did not call for a total ban on code-sharing ar-
rangements, it reminded DOT of its statutory obligation to disapprove of
agreements that could be detrimental to the U.S. airline industry.'47
Foreign carriers covet code-sharing arrangements with U.S. carriers
because they increase the value of their bilateral rights.'48 However,
Dec. 28, 1993, at 475 (noting that the proposed union buy-out of United would place limitations
on management's ability to execute international code-share agreements if they would affect the
airline's level of international service).
" Wassenbergh, supra note 139, at 25 n.9.
141 DE LEON, supra note 59, at 116.
14' Bill Poling, KLM Code-Sharing Meets Opposition, TRAVEL WKLY., June 11, 1987, at 129.
143 Id.
'" Id. at 130; see generally James Ott, Foreign Airlines Switching Tactics In Seeking Rights
to U.S. Market, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June 15, 1987.
'41 S. REP. No. 198, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1988). See also H.R. REP. No. 202, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. 10, 11 (1988).
S*5. REP. No. 198, supra note 145, at 11.
" Id. at 12.
'4' "Code sharing arrangements on cabotage segments increase the economic value of the pre-
ceding or following long haul services to more than one foreign gateway." DE LEON, supra note
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despite these early objections, code-sharing has become an integral part
of most U.S. carriers' efforts to gain new passengers, perhaps in recog-
nition of the fact that the fastest growing market segment is international
traffic. Despite its similarity to cabotage, U.S. carriers probably view
code-sharing today as nothing more than a contractual agreement be-
tween carriers.'49
The importance of code-sharing to U.S. carriers should not be un-
derestimated. For example, Northwest Airlines recently filed a DOT
complaint detailing the German government's refusal to allow code-
sharing to Germany on Northwest-KLM flights from Amsterdam. The
German government viewed the arrangement as a violation of
Northwest's frequency allocation as specified in the U.S.-German bilater-
al agreement.' ° The German (Lufthansa) response notes that code-shar-
ing provides Northwest with the ability to sell services between the
United States and Germany, as if Northwest was operating the service
solely by itself.'5 ' Lufthansa also argued that code-sharing might be
more beneficial than actually operating a route because of the reduced
economic risk.'52 In fact, the thrust of the dispute between Northwest
and Germany is whether, for bilateral purposes, a flight operated under a
code-sharing agreement should be counted towards the flight frequency
limits under the bilateral agreement.'53
While code-sharing provides many benefits to U.S. carriers, notably
increased traffic from foreign carriers' home markets and increased
presence in overseas markets,'54 these agreements have become a
59, at 116.
"' Id. at 2 n.11. KLM once viewed code sharing as an interline practice, not a traffic right.
However, it has stated that code sharing's only advantage to foreign carriers is to provide a
better ranking in U.S. computer reservation systems. Five U.S. Airlines Battle United-BA Code-
Sharing, TRAVEL WKLY., Feb. 15, 1988, at 3. KLM also stated that "it is doubtful that [a]
foreign government would trade actual route rights or other economic benefits in return for code-
share opportunities that might diminish in value." Id. But see, Dutch Gain From U.S. Open
Skies, FLIGHT INT'L, Sept. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Trans Library, Air File (noting that
among other things the U.S. and Dutch agreement calls for unlimited code-share rights).
"5 See Complaint of Northwest Airlines, Inc. Against Lufthansa German Airlines and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, DOT Order 93-8-5 (Aug. 4, 1993).
' Answer of Lufthansa German Airlines, DOT Docket No. 49063, at 19 (Aug. 12, 1993).
152 Id. at 18.
'5 One of the key issues facing government aviation officials is what the value of a code-
share arrangement is. For example, what rights should a government demand for its carriers in
return for allowing code sharing? See As International Markets Change, Old Access Issues
Remain, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 28, 1993, at 475.
"u SAS "contributes 150,000 passengers" annually into the Continental route network through
Newark. SAS To Stay Out of Continental Bidding But Forge Closer Ties to Carrier, AVIATION
DAILY, Nov. 5, 1992, at 213.
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means by which foreign carriers have solved their access problems into
the U.S. market. This has hurt the larger U.S. carriers who have devel-
oped international routes through internal growth or asset purchase. 5
Code-sharing's results have caused many carriers to no longer desire
cabotage rights, specifically because access into the U.S. market can be
achieved through other means. 6
The reason the U.S. sought to prohibit cabotage was to preserve the
airline industry's financial health and protect the industry from the rigors
of foreign competition."7 Code-sharing appears to contravene many of
these objectives. While the U.S. carriers that have made agreements with
foreign carriers have benefitted, other carriers who have instead invested
corporate resources into developing their own international routes have
been disadvantaged by these agreements.'58 A U.S. carrier that receives
enough revenue from code-sharing could, conceivably, cross-subsidize by
underpricing seats on domestic flights. It would appear that because
foreign carriers view code-sharing as an acceptable alternative to the
elimination of cabotage provisions, it indicates that they must be realiz-
ing the economic advantages that cabotage laws seek to prohibit. 9
Assuming that code-sharing does not violate the letter of U.S. law,
the next inquiry is whether a code-sharing agreement, combined with an
equity investment by a foreign carrier, violates U.S. law with respect to
either cabotage or foreign control of U.S. carriers?
' As the United States Airports for Better International Air Service organization noted in a
recent letter to Sectretary Pena, code sharing "rights are of a limited benefit to our cities and the
travelling public [since c]ode sharing does not . . . add new nonstop service" on international
routes. USABIAS Wants DOT to Press for More International Routes, Aviation Daily, Dec. 29,
1993, at 479. The group also asked that code sharing negotiations be secondary to securing
actual increases in the number of international flights authorized between the U.S. and other
nations. Id.
" See Cathay Pacific, Cautious About North America, Sees Expansion in Europe, AVIATION
DAILY, Mar. 4, 1992, at 385. See also Terminating Bilateral with U.S. Not Ruled Out By
Lufthansa, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 24 1992, at 321. A Lufthansa official stated that "cabotage in
the U.S. does not interest Lufthansa [and] that access to passenger feed from smaller U.S.
markets is important, and . . . two possible means to achieve this feed [including] marketing
agreements with one or more U.S. carriers [or] if U.S. ownership rules were changed, Lufthansa
could acquire its own small, feeder line." Id.
" See supra notes 62-66.
,S See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Stephen M. Wolf). Mr. Wolf
notes that by purchasing shares in U.S. carriers, foreign carriers are able to purchase access to
the U.S. market without liberalization of their own markets. Id.
'" Getting unlimited code-share rights within the U.S. has become very important for KLM
because of the recently signed U.S.-Dutch bilateral agreement. Airlines now must "insure that
they have route-network distributions in regions where they can't get bilateral rights to fly." Agis
Salpukas, A Survival Move For KLM Airlines, N.Y. TIMFS, Sept. 25, 1992, at C4.
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V. MODERN VIEWS ON FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
A. Statutory Analysis
When a U.S. carrier receives equity from foreign sources, DOT
reviews the carriers' fitness.'"° DOT's determination is based in part on
whether a carrier is considered a U.S. citizen.'61 In early 1991, DOT
pronounced a standard which would determine the outcome of future
foreign investments in U.S. carriers." The case involved the 1989
purchase of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holding.'63 Shortly after an-
nouncing its intentions, Wings issued a tender offer for Northwest
stock."64 Investment partners KLM and Elders IXL Ltd. (Elders) pur-
chased almost $500 million in stock. The total available investment was
$705 million." 5 Two-thirds of the $3 billion in loans used to finance
the acquisition came from foreign banks." KLM and Elders were
each given one position on the Northwest board, and KLM was allowed
160 The statutory mandate for DOT review is found at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(r) which states
that:
[t]he requirement that each applicant for a certificate . . . must be found to
be fit, willing, and able to perform properly the transportation covered ...
and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board under this chapter
shall be a continuing requirement applicable to each such air carrier.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1371(r) (1992). Additionally, 14 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1992) states that a "certified
carrier proposing a substantial change in operations shall file the data set forth in this section."
Id.
161 Citizenship and control is determined by a two-part test which is generally satisfied by
the limitation of foreign equity investment to 25% and by the requirement that at least two-thirds
of the airline's board be comprised of U.S. citizens. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1992). The
most significant issue is control of the airline. The statute explicitly requires that at least three-
quarters of the voting interests be in U.S. hands. Id. While the statute is silent on other means
of exercising control, many legal experts believe that factors such as the ability to select board
members, veto rights over decisions, dispersion of voting stock, and other factors may be more
salient tests then the percentage of total voting shares. See also Martin Tolchin, Will British
Airways Control USAir?, N.Y. TimS, Mar. 17, 1993, at C16. DOT seems to be aware of these
other factors, and precedent suggests that Congressional intent is clear- U.S. carriers may not be
controlled by foreigners, and DOT should withdraw the operating certificate if it has any doubts
that a carrier is controlled by non-U.S. nationals. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1992).
2 In the Matter of the Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holding, Inc., DOT
Order 91-1-41 (Jan. 23, 1991) [hereinafter DOT Order 91-1-41] (Wings Holding was a private
holding company created by the investors who purchased Northwest Airlines).
"6 In the matter of The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines By Wings Holding, Inc., DOT Or-
der 89-9-51, (Sept. 29, 1989) [hereinafter DOT Order 89-9-51].
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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to create a committee to advise Northwest on financial affairs. 67
DOT was concerned about whether KLM would be able to exert
control over Northwest, through Wings, and that the size of the debt
would unduly burden Northwest.'68 Although DOT ruled that North-
west remained a U.S. citizen, it was concerned that the airline would be
controlled by KLM. 69 DOT noted that the control test
has traditionally been a complex matter in past cases. Analysis in this
area has always necessarily been on a case-by-case basis, as there are
a myriad of potential avenues of control. The control standard is a de
facto one - we seek to discover whether a foreign interest may be in
a position to exercise actual control over the airline, i.e., whether it
will have a substantial ability to influence the carrier's activities. 7
DOT went on to note that "influence may be concentrated or diffuse. It
need not be identified with any particular nationality . . . be shown to
have sinister intent [or] be continually exercisable on a day-to-day ba-
sis.''
DOT first determined that neither the banks providing loans nor
Elders were in a position, either individually or jointly, to exercise con-
trol. 172 Notwithstanding the magnitude of KLM's investment, and its
stated intention to become involved in Northwest's decisionmaking, 73
the proposed agreement did not violate the citizenship test because
KLM's voting stock, together with all other foreign shareholders, was
less than twenty-five percent." The agreement did, however, indicate
that KLM would control Northwest through the equity investment which,
despite not having voting rights, did include a number of ancillary rights
which would allow a check on management in certain situations.'75
DOT was concerned with KLM's ability to appoint a financial advisory
committee and by the unrestricted nature of the KLM board members'
voting power.'76 After applying a strict level of scrutiny,' DOT con-
167 I.
163 Id.
16 Id.
170 Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
' In the Matter of Inter Arctic Services, Inc., DOT Order 87-8-43, at 5 (Aug. 18, 1987)
[hereinafter DOT Order 87-8-43].
"2 DOT Order 89-9-51, supra note 163, at 9.
173 Id.
274 Id. at 11.
75 Examples of when KLM could check management arise with regard to the issuance of
securities and other amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation. Id. at 12-13.
r76 Id. at 13-14.
1 Id. at 15 (noting that DOT applies stricter scrutiny when the investor is an airline, par-
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cluded that "KLM would be in a position to exercise ... control over
Northwest, and .. the latter could thereby cease to be a U.S. citizen
for purposes of the Federal Aviation Act."' 78 DOT was most concerned
that KLM's investment was too large in a relative sense, that KLM
could apply influence in ways that compensated for their inability to
vote their shares, and that KLM was (and remains) a Northwest compet-
itor on certain routes.
79
Northwest (Wings) and KLM agreed to a number of changes in the
original ownership structure in order to avoid judicial involvement in
determining whether citizenship requirements had been violated. 8' The
major revisions included a reduction in KLM's investment to only twen-
ty-five percent of total equity, dissolution of the financial advisory
board, and recusal of KLM's representative to the Northwest board in
certain circumstances.' Additionally, Northwest and Wings agreed to
file regular reports concerning their ownership structure.' DOT based
its ultimate decision on the theory that KLM's investment, having been
reduced, would result in "KLM's ability to influence Northwest [being]
significantly reduced."' 83
In 1991, Wings Holdings requested a modification of the original
consent decree. In its petition for modification, Wings requested that
KLM's non-voting equity investment be allowed to rise to 49 percent
with just over 10 percent to be held as voting shares, that Northwest be
permitted to increase the total number of board members to fifteen with
three appointed by KLM, and that a termination of the financial disclo-
sure requirements be accomplished."u
DOT permitted the modification, noting that the decision was
reached "in the context of the liberalized aviation relationship that pre-
vails between the United States" and the Netherlands.'85 Although the
statute does not mention the issue of U.S. aviation relations, DOT ap-
parently believes that it is a legitimate criterion when considering invest-
ment by foreign carriers.'86 DOT again declined to set forth specific
ticularly a competitor, because of ownership and control questions).
1 Id. at 16.
7 Id. at 10-11.
i Id. at 17-18.
Id.
" Id. at 19.
8 Id. at 18.
184 See DOT Order 91-1-41, supra note 162.
"u Id. at 16.
18 In approving the second USAir-British Airways agreement, U.S. Transportation Secretary
Frederico Pena noted "that the future of the agreement will depend on a renegotiation of the air
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standards for determining when a U.S. carrier is controlled by foreign
owners. DOT instead stated that
[W]e have reviewed the relationship between voting equity, on the one
hand, and nonvoting equity and debt, on the other [and] we continue
to believe that 'check-list' standards are not advisable due to the
uniqueness and complexity of each transaction .... 1
By making this modification to its original order, DOT expanded
the availability of foreign capital for U.S. airlines. While Secretary
Skinner's decision in this case has proven to be precedent setting, the
decision itself should not be viewed as surprising. In 1989, North Amer-
ican Airlines (NAA), a U.S. carrier, was granted a certificate to provide
transportation with significant backing from El AL, the state airline of
Israel.' El Al had agreed to the following terms with NAA:
El Al will (1) provide $400,000 ($75,000 as equity) to assist with
start-up funding, (2) secure the availability of a B-757 aircraft and
serve, for five years, as the garniture of one month's aircraft lease
payment (approximately $400,000), (3) have the option to receive 24.9
percent of the outstanding common stock of NAA and a seat on the
carrier's board of directors, and receive a guarantee that, until it has
exercised its ownership option and as long as it is guaranteeing the
aircraft lease, Mr. McKinnon (the founder of NAA and former head of
the CAB) will not sell or distribute NAA stock to any parties without
El Al's consent, which would not be unreasonably withheld."9
NAA was to supply passengers from Los Angeles to El Al flights leav-
ing New York.'90 DOT stated that because the financing for NAA was
a simple capital structure (as opposed to the original Northwest deal),
there was no large influx of cash which might suggest a hidden agenda
of control. 9' In addition, because much of NAA's U.S. debt and equi-
ty were vested in a single individual, there would be a much lower
likelihood of minority control.'92 DOT was also unconcerned that ap-
travel treaty between the United States and Britain." Richard M. Weintraub, USAir Deal Ap-
proved By Clinton, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1993, at Al.
"n In this case, DOT reexamined the control test based on the "global corporate and finan-
cial environment." DOT Order 91-1-41, supra note 162, at 19 (explaining that at the time of this
decision, the U.S. recession had begun and the effects of the Persian Gulf War were combining
to drastically cut airline revenues).
... Application of North American Airlines, Inc., DOT Final Order 89-11-26 (Nov. 14, 1989).
" Application of North American Airlines, Inc., DOT Order 89-11-8 (Nov. 6, 1989).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. This is despite the fact that all of the foreign equity was invested by El Al.
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proximately 30 percent of NAA's first year revenues would be generated
from traffic associated with El Al flights.193 DOT was even sympathet-
ic to the traditional security concerns of El Al. The original agreement
had been concluded as a code-sharing agreement, but because of security
arrangements, the flights would be operated as a single entity charter
agreement where "El Al would lease a NAA's B-757 aircraft with NAA
crews and operate nonstop El Al flights between New York City and
Los Angeles carrying only passengers arriving from or departing to
points in Israel."'94 DOT went to great length to contrast the control
issues in this case with those in the original Northwest agreement.
While El Al may hold the remaining interest, its capital contribution
reflects that interest proportionately, with no outsize contributions sug-
gesting a hidden quid pro quo and a corollary means of control. More-
over, the concentration of the U.S. debt and equity interest in a single
individual suggest a much lesser power of control by the minority
interest given similar opportunities, than if the U.S. interest was dissi-
pated among numerous stockholders and lenders."
DOT's decisions in the NAA and Northwest case seem difficult to
harmonize. The Northwest case represents an equity agreement between
two of the world's largest airlines, each with a separate base of opera-
tions, and each relying on the other for a small percentage of their total
revenues. By contrast, NAA, a new carrier, will be relying on El Al for
almost one-third of its first year revenues. Furthermore, KLM does not
place limitations on the operation of Northwest's aircraft, as El Al in-
sisted upon in its agreements with NAA. In the end, DOT viewed the
NAA-El Al agreement to be a simple commercial transaction.
While DOT may view the NAA-El Al agreement as an arm's
length transaction, the details of the investment indicate that it is a more
complex arrangement. By investing in a new U.S. carrier, El Al in-
creased the load factor on its New York-Tel Aviv route without having
to fly non-stop from Tel Aviv to Los Angeles. It also maintained its
security standards through passenger control at its Los Angeles check-in.
Several questions are raised by this arrangement. First, would NAA have
begun operations without El Al's investment? Second, does a commer-
cial agreement alone offer enough guarantee to El Al, or does El Al
need an equity investment in order to ensure control of its access to the
U.S. market?
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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A review of NAA's finances suggests that contrary to the initial
forecasts, El Al's revenues may not be declining as a proportion of total
revenues. NAA grosses approximately $16 million annually from the El
Al agreement, Club Med charter operations, and the U.S. military.'96
Yet, the code-sharing arrangement with El Al has expanded, and NAA
has added service to Baltimore-Washington, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Ft.
Worth, and Miami.97 Furthermore, on NAA's aircraft, cabin interiors
look like El Al's, with flight crews that speak Hebrew and provide
kosher catering.'98 El Al has exercised a purchase option, giving it
24.9 percent of NAA stock.' 99
DOT faces many difficulties in determining what constitutes a U.S.
carrier. In dealing with them, DOT adheres to the statutory limitations
imposed by Congress, but its decisions demonstrate that it has the abili-
ty to exercise great latitude.
B. Current Issues in Foreign Ownership
DOT recently examined the proposed USAir-British Airways
deal.' The transaction
calls for British Airways to make an investment of $750 million in
USAir for which British Airways will receive convertible preferred
shares, representation on the USAir Board and a joint commitment to
integrate the activities of the two airlines."0'
American, Delta, United, and other U.S. airlines strongly opposed the
deal on a number of different grounds. 2 These carriers believed that
British Airways would have the right to dictate every important aspect
16 Robert McNatt, Small Airline Flies into a Sound Niche, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., May 11-17,
1992, at 19.
" Lester Geiss, El Al Moves to Make Tel Aviv An Efficient Hub and Spoke Network,
WORLD AIRLINE NEws, Aug. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ZTPI File; Addition-
al cities being included are Atlanta, Mexico City, and San Francisco. El Al, AIRPORTS, Mar. 31,
1992, at 126.
9 See Geiss, supra note 197.
' McNatt, supra note 196.
" British Ainvays to Invest $750 Million in USAir, First Step in Creation of World's Larg-
est Airline Alliance, USAir Press Release, July 21, 1992.
20 Id.
' A Delta representative has stated that "[t]he BA-USAir deal without liberalization of the
U.S.-U.K. bilateral, is a unilateral giveaway of the U.S. transport market, and would make it
virtually impossible for the U.S. to achieve its objective to liberalize world aviation markets."
USAir Chairman Lashes Back at Crandall, Criticism of BA Deal, AvIATioN DAILY, Sept. 18,
1992, at 485.
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of USAir's business, including for example, who it can hire to run the
company, what markets it can serve, what airplanes it may acquire,
and what prices it should charge. 3
The carriers also believed that the "planned integration of marketing and
operational functions would produce a single 'airline system' controlled
by British Airways and operating under one 'management
structure."' 2  At least one writer has concluded that this type of for-
eign investment is de facto cabotge,"5 a conclusion supported by Alas-
ka Airlines."l Yet, Sir Colin Marshall of British Airways believes that
an investor must have some degree of control over an investment.2°
The U.S. position, dating back to the Chicago Convention, has been that
"no country will wish to have its essential internal air communications
under the domination of any save their own nationals. 2 8
After talks between the U.S. and Great Britain failed to allow U.S.
carriers additional access to London's Heathrow Airport, British Airways
withdrew from the deal.21 Those carriers opposed to the deal were
less concerned with control over USAir,10 then with the opportunity to
- See POWELL TATE, AMERICAN AIRLINES, UNITED AIRLINES, DELTA AIRLINES & UNITED
PARCEL SERVICE, AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL POLICY, COMPETITION AND FAIRNESS (1992).
Id. at 3.
See generally, J.A. Donoghue, Open the Door; US Domestic Air Travel Market Should be
Opened to Foreign Airlines, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Aug. 1992, at 5.
See Order 91-1-41, supra note 162, at 15 n.16.
Marshall has stated that British Airways is interested in creating a truly global airline but
that it would not make large risky investments "without having a high degree of control." Mar-
shall Rails Against U.S. Ownership Law, European Subsidies, AVIATION DAILY, May 22, 1992,
at 329. He cites foreign carriers' lost investment in America West and Continental which has
been wiped out due to bankruptcy. Id. Notwithstanding Marshall's comments, the important ques-
tion is what is a foreign carrier's real investment motivation? Aside from a return on investment,
solidification of marketing agreements and U.S. market access may be the primary answer. See
generally, Paul Stephen Dempsey, U.S. Deregulation's Result May Be Foreign Domination,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Nov. 2, 1992, at 65.
Lewis, supra note 13, at 1063.
USAir Citizenship Proceeding, DOT Order 92-12-27 (Dec. 22, 1992); Richard M.
Weintraub, British Airways Drops Plan For USAir Links, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1992, at Al.
A4. A new plan for a strategic alliance between British Airways and USAir was recently un-
veiled. The plan called for an immediate $300 million investment in USAir by British Airways,
and included a code-share agreement and the right to make future investments in USAir depend-
ing on "financial and regulatory conditions." British Airways, USAir Jump Back Into Fray With
$300 Million Investment, AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 22, 1993, at 123. The plan was approved March
15, 1993 by the U.S. government. Martin Tolchin, U.S. Approves British Stake in USAir but Is-
sues Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at Cl.
2' American Airlines Chairman, Robert L. Crandall, has stated that the agreement "seems
consistent with American's advocacy of greater liberalization of opportunities for international
carriers but should be blocked unless U.S. carriers are allowed larger opportunities in Britain."
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gain increased access to the British aviation market."'
Paradoxically, criticism of the Northwest-KLM antitrust immunity
waiver was less controversial, despite being described as a merger
by Northwest's Chief Operating Officer. 3 The distinction between the
two agreements is that the KLM-Northwest deal is based on an arrange-
ment reached between the U.S. and the Netherlands, which allows
among other things, unlimited access for U.S. carriers into the Nether-
lands.14  This demonstrates that, contrary to suggestions from
USAr,25 U.S. airlines are primarily interested in reciprocal opportuni-
ties to compete in foreign countries.2 Former-Secretary of Transporta-
tion Andrew H. Card, Jr. underscored this by stating that he had
.. 'flexibility' on the so-called control issue if a country fully opens up
its airports to U.S. airlines." '217
The most recent deal involving investment in a U.S. airline by a
Airlines in Partnership, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1992, at A24.
2.. Id. While large U.S. carriers are persistent in their arguments that the British should allow
U.S. carriers expanded rights, it is also these carriers that are most likely to benefit from the
granting of any new rights.
212 In their filing, the carriers seek "to establish a legal framework under which the two
carriers may operate as if they were a single firm." Joint Application of Northwest Airlines, Inc.
and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines for Approval and Antitrust Immunity of an Agreement, DOT
Order 92-9-30 (Sep. 16, 1992) (the filing also states that should they be allowed to act like one
firm, the ancillary agreements (if any) should be treated as "private agreements ... [of] a single
firm and of no further interest to the government.").
2' The proposed global alliance between the two carriers provides for a full integration "of
their commercial operations, allowing them to operate as if they were a single firm." Bill Poling,
Northwest, KLM Seek to Operate as Single Firm Under New Pact, TRAVEL WKLY., Sept. 14,
1992, at 1. Besides the obvious plans to coordinate schedules and increase customer convenience,
the carriers are considering integrating their sales forces and commissions, as well as pricing and
the "sharing and/or pooling of revenue." Id. (emphasis added). The goal of such a proposal is
the creation of "'seamless service' in which passengers would feel they are getting the same
quality throughout a flight." Agis Salpukas, How Northwest and KLM Would Unite, N.Y. TwES,
Sept. 10, 1992, at Cl.
214 The new agreement is the most liberal bilateral agreement that the U.S. has ever signed.
Some of the provisions include no restrictions on destinations, frequencies, capacity, and the right
to fly to other countries (subject to third government approval). See Agis Salpukas, A Survival
Move For KLM Airlines, N.Y. TtMES, Sept. 25, 1992, at C4. KLM also has the right to code-
share in every U.S. city. Id. There was little reaction in the industry because observers noted
that the agreement is of little benefit to the U.S., and does not provide much incentive for other
nations to sign new agreements with the U.S. See James Ott, More Skies to Open As U.S. Signs
Pact, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 14, 1992, at 32.
21' See Statement of USAir Chairman Seth E. Schofield, USAir Press Release, Sept. 17, 1992
(stating that the objective of airlines such as American is to prevent competition by other
carriers).
..6 See TATE, supra note 203.
217 See Weintraub, supra note 209.
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non-U.S. carrier was the Continental-Air Canada agreement which was
finalized in early 1993. At one point, five different suitors had made
offers to acquire a financial interest in Continental."' The structure of
the deal called for Air Canada to invest $235 million and receive 27.5%
of the total equity and 24% of the voting stock, while Air Canada's
U.S. partner (Air Partners) would invest $215 million and receive 27.5%
of total equity and 41% of the total voting stock.219 Both Air Canada
and Air Partners will select six board members2m
DOT did not undertake a formal public review of the proposed
transaction, and there is very little official DOT documentation ex-
plaining the transaction's approval. In a later proceeding, DOT did state
that the "great majority of Continental's equity is held by U.S. citizens,
not by Air Canada."'" In addition, DOT viewed the relationship be-
tween the two carriers as consistent with existing U.S. law, and the
marketing alliance was typical of those entered into by other air-
lines. 2  Secretary Card noted that the deal's approval reaffirmed the
Bush Administration's willingness to allow overseas investment in U.S.
carders. 3
C. Conclusion
A review of cabotage and foreign ownership suggests that if code-
sharing agreements are viewed as a basic contractual agreements bet-
ween airlines, then it is probably impossible to link code-sharing with
cabotage. Yet, if the underlying reasons that carriers seek code-sharing
agreements are examined, it becomes clear that the purposes of cabotage
prohibitions are being negated. Where code-sharing agreements are part
of a larger alliance and involve a significant equity investment, then
claims that argue that code-sharing is not related to cabotage, particular-
ly when control is at issue, should be viewed with skepticism. If a
foreign carrier is able to exercise control, then suggestions that the U.S.
aircraft has essentially been re-flagged and is therefore violating U.S.
218 The different groups included the parent company of AeroMexico, the largest shareholder
of Mexicana Airlines, SAS, and Lufthansa, in addition to Air Canada's successful bid. See David
A. Brown, Court Approves Plan For Continental Bidding, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLO-
GY, Oct. 12, 1992, at 61.
219 Martin Tolchin, U.S. Approves Financing for Continental Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1993, at D3.
Id. (Continental's Board has 18 members).
z' Id.
U.S. Colombia Combination Service Case, DOT Order 93-9-12, at 8 (Aug. 10, 1993).
2 See Martin Tolchin, U.S. Approves Financing for Continental Airlines, N.Y. TiMES, Jan 8,
1993, at D3.
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law, are proper. This is not to suggest that such alliances are inherently
bad; rather, U.S. law needs to be modified to reflect the dramatically
different environment in which airlines currently operate.
VI. OPEN SKIES
Since the Chicago Convention, international aviation has been gov-
erned by bilateral agreements between countries. The DOT has made a
concerted effort to remove barriers so as to allow U.S. carriers entry
into foreign markets. One approach is to sign less restrictive bilateral
agreements with other like-minded countries.2 4 It has been demonstrat-
ed that in markets governed by liberal agreements, air travel grows at
much faster rates than in markets with restrictive agreements.'
U.S. policymakers have once again focussed efforts on obtaining a
U.S.-European Open Skies regime. 6 Success in this area would re-
quire the removal of all non-safety related government imposed barriers
affecting air travel between the U.S. and Europe. This "deregulation" of
U.S.-European air markets could then be used as a model for future
agreements with other nations and regions. Key aspects of such a re-
gime include open entry on all routes, unrestricted capacity and frequen-
cy on all routes, unlimited rights between the U.S. and any point in
Europe, flexibility in fare-setting, less restrictive charter and cargo ar-
rangements, freedom of currency conversion, open code-sharing arrange-
ments, self-handling provisions, freedom of contract related to flight
operations, and commitment to non-discriminatory operation of, and
access to, computer reservation systems. 7 It is too early to tell if
Open Skies will successfully liberalize air travel between the U.S. and
Europe.
DOT continues to attempt to satisfy all interests.22 Those opposed
to such a change are satisfied by DOT's failure to articulate a position
on foreign ownership and cabotage. Yet, by allowing for open code-
sharing arrangements, DOT appears willing to trade unlimited access for
foreign carriers in U.S. markets for similar rights overseas. Indeed, early
indicators demonstrated that the original USAir-British Airways deal was
in jeopardy because of the inability of the U.S. and British governments
' See Gomez-Ibanez, supra note 39, at 113 (discussing that proponents of an Open Skies
policy believe that restrictions on travel harm "air travellers and the economy in general").
225 Id. at 114-16.
' See In the Matter of Defining "Open Skies," DOT Order 92-8-13 (Aug. 5, 1992) [herein-
after DOT Order 92-8-13].
27 Id.
' The purpose behind the Open Skies initiative was to "liberalize, to the maximum extent,
the aviation markets between and beyond the U.S. and Europe." Id.
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to reach an Open Skies arrangement. n9 Thus, the new policy of Open
Skies appears to be nothing more than a formalization of how DOT has
been operating in recent years. While this effort is unlikely to yield
significant results, it does appear to be an effort by DOT to liberalize
air travel while adhering to its statutory constraints.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
DOT must follow statutory provisions developed in the 1930s,
while trying to encourage liberalization of air travel in the 1990s. In
order to address this dilemma, the U.S. must re-examine its justifications
for cabotage and foreign ownership restrictionsY The U.S. govern-
ment is no longer responsible for the economic success of airlines; air-
lines are free to enter virtually any domestic market they wish to serve,
with no restrictions on frequency, capacity, or any other operational
decision. Fears of destructive competition no longer drive U.S. policy
towards the airline industry and, therefore, the market should be allowed
to determine the number of competitors."
The most significant obstacle to the U.S. changing its laws to per-
mit it to lead in the liberalization of air services is the relatively im-
mense size of its own market. The Open Skies Agreement with the
Netherlands is indicative. Under the agreement, any Dutch carrier can
fly to any point within the U.S. from the Netherlands." In return,
U.S. carriers can fly to any point in the Netherlands. 3 Disparity in
relative market size and lack of reciprocation by other governments have
proven to be the largest obstacles to changes in international air ser-
vice.'
This has led to an inability to directly confront issues such as cabo-
tage and foreign ownership. Instead, DOT has been forced to find ways
to inject competition into aviation, while not violating the letter of U.S.
Weintraub, supra note 209.
As Robert Crandall has pointed out "[o]wnership is the same thing as cabotage and it's
easier and better." Joan Feldman, On Getting From Here to There; International Aviation Struc-
ture is Becoming Obsolete, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, July 1990, at 23.
" The best example of this is the fact that a number of airlines in the country, including
Eastern and Pan Am, have gone bankrupt.
2 A KLM official called the deal a "'dream' agreement," while American Airlines President
Robert Crandall said, "Holland is a very small country [and wle get nothing." See CONG. REC.
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 1993) (statement of Hon. Leon E. Panetta).
233 id.
' As early as 1984, some commentators already thought that the relative strengths of U.S.
carriers would allow them to compete effectively in a competitive marketplace if the U.S.
government could convince other nations to open up their markets. Gomez-Ibanez, supra note 39,
at 109. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
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law. DOT has protected itself by refusing to articulate a test for foreign
ownership, and by allowing U.S. and foreign airline contractual agree-
ments to permit increased access to U.S. markets. This results in an ad
hoc policy which breeds confusion, and ultimately, reduces consumer
choice and provides fewer opportunities for U.S. airlines overseas.
Legislative change also needs to occur. The U.S. should allow U.S.
airlines to be purchased by foreign carriers and, under certain conditions,
remove U.S. cabotage restrictions. 5 As previously mentioned, one of
the reasons for the prohibition on foreign ownership stemmed from
national security concerns. While these concerns may have diminished,
they still exist. Therefore, any legislative change in foreign ownership
provisions should require DOT, perhaps in conjunction with other gov-
ernment agencies, to retain the right to disapprove of foreign investment
in U.S. carriers if national security is threatened. Congress may also
want to consider lifting the DOT's orders immunity from judicial review
since the purpose behind liberalization would be to promote commercial
arrangements between airlines, and not to maintain airlines as foreign
policy tools of government.
Among the problems facing the Clinton Administration, is the fact
that the industry has become deeply divided on what type of approach
to take." Complaints about the present bilateral system have in-
creased,27 yet many nations do not seem to favor another multilateral
Chicago Convention." Despite nearly fifty years of trade liberaliza-
' Former CAB official Michael Levine has said before Congress that the U.S. should do
away with ownership restrictions and cabotage with countries that are willing to reciprocate with
the U.S. . See Bill Poling, Kahn, Levine Call for More Foreign Ownership of U.S. Carriers,
TRAVEL WKLY., May 23, 1991, at 10. The Airline Commission recommended allowing up to
49% of voting equity to be held by foreign, non-government investors, provided that U.S.
airlines had similar rights in the context of a liberal aviation agreement. See COMMISsION RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 22-23.
' The battle has been characterized as the "strong vs. the weak" in which the airline
"industry is so at war with itself that the carriers can't agree on what sort of assistance they
need from government." Ingersoll and Pulley, supra note 4.
rn Another former DOT official has stated that a system of bilateral agreements is inappro-
priate for a mature industry because it permits protectionism too readily. See Poling, supra note
235; House Aviation Subcommittee Chairman James Oberstar noted that the bilateral system "is
too confining and rigid for the evolving liberalized air system [and] is no longer adequately
responding to the broader and stronger ties governing trade ...." See Rep. Oberstar Says DOT
Must Unchain Itself From Bilaterals, AVIATION DAILY, Sep. 30, 1991, at 599. Factors which
help ensure success in negotiating an unrestricted bilateral agreement include a negotiating partner
whose government has a free-market ideology, who is strong national carrier, and whose air
traffic can easily be diverted to other nations. Gomez-Ibanez, supra note 39, at 118.
' Joan M. Feldman, On having it both ways; International Civil Aviation Organization's
Colloquium on Air-Transport Regulations, AiR TRANSPORT WORLD, June 1992, at 210 (noting
that at the conference a majority of countries still regard air transport as "special").
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tion, many nations still fear that their sovereignty and national interests
would be subordinated if they allow a multinational body to negotiate
on their behalf. 9 Similarly, foreign airlines are also debating the best
approach. Large airlines such as Air France and Japan Airlines, as well
as smaller carriers such as Royal Jordanian and Air India, support the
bilateral system as a means of preventing U.S. carriers from dominating
international markets.2' Other carriers, such as Swissair and Singapore
Airlines, suggest that smaller countries may be better off without flag
carriers and bilateral restrictions.24' These carriers generally have small
domestic markets and would like the opportunity to further develop their
route systems.242
One proposed solution that should be further explored is known as
a plurilateral agreement.2 43 A plurilateral agreement is defined as an
agreement between two nations which other nations can agree to fol-
low.2 4 A plurilateral arrangement will not open all markets immediate-
ly, but it will gradually achieve this goal by increasing the number of
countries that are committed to a specific set of principles. For example,
the U.S. position is that it is unwilling to discuss changes in foreign
ownership and cabotage, except on a case-by-case basis. This position is
understandable, because if the U.S. negotiated cabotage rights with one
nation, other nations would seek similar rights in their bilateral agree-
ment. This could lead to extremely difficult negotiations with nations
who generally follow protectionist policies. By signing Open Skies
agreements with individual nations, a base of common agreement would
be solidified. It would then be much easier to convene a multilateral
convention among these countries to consider subjects such as foreign
ownership and cabotage. The interim period would also allow a transi-
tion in which problems could be resolved more effectively because a
smaller number of nations would be involved.
239 Id.
2 The fear of these carriers is that in any multilateral world the only winners will be U.S.
carriers. See James Ott, Free Trade Advocates Foresee End of Bilaterals, AVIATION WK &
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Apr. 13, 1992, at 10.
24 Proponents of multilateral negotiations favor treating airline services similar to other
products and services. Id. This view was echoed by the Commission which noted that continued
reliance on bilateral agreements will be detrimental to American interests. See COMMISSION
REPORT, supra, note 1, at 21.
242 id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Fifty years ago, a restrictive aviation accord was signed at the
Chicago Convention. The restrictions were largely driven by fears of
U.S. dominance. Fifty years later, efforts to liberalize aviation are again
stalled because of concerns of U.S. dominance. In the interim, the U.S.
has developed the largest and most efficient air transportation system in
the world, with most of its growth coming after 1978. This success
should serve as the impetus for other nations to abandon their protec-
tionist policies. The ultimate goal of these efforts should one day allow
a passenger to fly an American airline, owned by an Australian compa-
ny, between Rome and Naples.

